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THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: SPORTING
EVENT OR QUEST FOR TRUTH?
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.*
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the
School of Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in
1949, to honor the memory of a well-loved alumnus and faculty member
whose connection with and service to the school extended over the period
1898-1947. This fifteenth annual lecture was delivered March 13, 1963.
Over the last fifteen years many distinguished judges, law teachers
and lawyers have joined you in this annual tribute to the memory of an
eminent teacher and scholar of the law. You will therefore appreciate
my delight in accepting the signal honor of your invitation. The papers
already delivered from this podium have indeed set a high standard.
And it is significant, I think, that those papers have a common thread,
if different themes. All make the point, by one formulation or an-
other, that the quest for better justice is a ceaseless quest, that the
single constant for our profession is the need for continuous examina-
tion and reexamination of our premises as to what law should do to
achieve better justice. This has encouraged me to choose the subject
upon which I shall speak this morning. Should we extend to criminal
prosecutions the civil pre-trial discovery techniques which force both
sides of a civil law suit to put all cards on the table before trial, and
tend to reduce the chance that surprise or maneuver, rather than
truth, may determine the outcome of the trial? Or, as Glanville
Williams asked recently, shall we continue to regard the criminal trial
as "in the nature of a game or sporting contest" and not "a serious
inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and innocence"?,
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Williams, Advance Notice of the Defence, 1959 CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 548,
554.
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Before we get too deeply into that subject, one observation is appro-
priate, perhaps even necessary. My subject involves, of course, a
question of criminal procedure-the process by which one accused of
any crime has his guilt or innocence decided. Now it's a matter for real
concern, I submit, that so many in our society, laymen and lawyers
alike, show impatience with any and all procedures which appear to
hamper the task of law enforcement agencies to bring an accused to
conviction. More people than not resent the privilege against self-
incrimination. Confessions extracted by prolonged interrogation of an
accused may concern judges and criminologists, but trouble little the
consciences of others. Police without a search or arrest warrant have
broken down a suspect's door and provoked little public outcry, if
perchance they stumbled on evidence which eventually proved his
guilt. Too many of us seem to have forgotten the true office of the
constitutional procedural safeguards against police tactics such as
these. We have forgotten that these safeguards, while they do indeed
make harder the conviction of an accused, were not provided for that
purpose-the Framers of the Constitution weren't "soft on criminals."
These safeguards are checks upon government-to guarantee that
government shall remain the servant and not the master of us all. My
Brother Douglas made the point from this podium four years ago that
what distinguishes our criminal law from that of totalitarian regimes
is really only this: that however desirable the ends, long and bloody
history taught us that there are some police tactics that are not safely
tolerated in a free society; in addition to the question whether our free
society can morally tolerate them, such toleration could only end up in
making government the oppressor of each and every one of us.2
But public misunderstanding of the true function of the procedural
guarantees is, I submit, something in great measure the fault of our
profession. How can we blame laymen for their impatience with pro-
cedural safeguards when so many lawyers believe that contributing
one's legal services to an unpopular or unremunerative cause is dirty,
or nasty, or opprobrious? It is a much overworked observation, but
one which I can't resist repeating because it is central to this point,
that far too, many lawyers-usually without knowing why-look
askance at criminal practice, even as an incidental supplement to a
regular corporate or business practice.
This attitude relates partly, I know, to the status of practitioners of
criminal law in our country. My Brother Douglas said in his recent
Madison Lecture at New York University:
In 1770 British soldiers were tried in Boston for killing Ameri-
cans in an episode known as the "Boston Massacre." John Adams
2. Douglas, The Means and The End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103.
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and Josiah Quincy, Jr., defended them, six being acquitted and
two being convicted of manslaughter. Feelings ran high. But
Adams and Quincy did not hesitate, Adams saying that counsel
"ought to be the last thing that an accused person should want in
a free country." This was in the best tradition of our Bar.3
Too few leaders of today's Bar show the same consciousness of their
professional responsibility; a noble tradition seems to have been for-
gotten by far too many. I must say frankly that I think the law schools
have to share some of the blame for this lack of what should be wide-
spread devotion to the tradition. I don't think the criminal law, par-
ticularly criminal procedure, is given as central a position as it should
have in law school curricula. I have the uneasy feeling that whatever
instruction there is in this field doesn't sufficiently drive home that
many of our most precious guarantees of liberty and human dignity
are at hazard in criminal procedures. Certainly the law schools do not
turn out droves of bright young men anxious to carve out a career in
criminal law-at least for the defense. Estates, corporate, tax, admin-
istrative law, all of these arouse far more interest. I don't doubt that
the relatively greater financial return in those specialties plays a large
part in the choice. But if the law schools give only cursory attention to
criminal procedures in the curriculum, it is hard to see how students
can be blamed for coming away from law school with the feeling that
perhaps the institution also shares the unfortunate tendency of the
community to disapprove of lawyers who undertake the defense of
people charged with crime. And the worst result of this is the conse-
quent ignorance even on the part of very able lawyers of the extent
some of the most precious values of our society are involved in the
administration of criminal justice. It is significant that in an-
nouncing a grant of almost three million dollars to improve legal
representation of indigents, the Ford Foundation emphasized the im-
portance of this particular function in the whole spectrum of the
lawyer's responsibility.
The problem is not simply one of apathy toward the practice of
criminal law. Criminals are not the only unpopular or nasty people
who need good lawyers and find it hard to get them among the grad-
uates of the best schools. Here, too, our professional tradition has
markedly and sadly changed. To quote Justice Douglas again:
In American history lawyers have often rallied opinion outside
of courtrooms in support of the despised minorities. Charles
Evans Hughes, William E. Borah, and John W. Davis served in
that role. A few lawyers still speak in that tradition. But most
lawyers have remained silent.'
3. DOUGLAs, The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rms. 207, 216
(1963).
4. Ibid.
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Yet, innumerable civil rights cases require expert counsel in their
preparation and presentation. One wonders where the cause of school
desegregation and the removal of racial barriers from public facilities
throughout the country would be today without the untiring efforts of
a very few good lawyers who allowed the nobility of the cause to over-
come its unpopularity in their own minds, and cared little what their
neighbors thought, or how ran their stock in the local bar association.
I have a feeling that there is a pressing need for a rethinking by law
teachers of the adequacy of law school curricula in these fields-here
may be "one way of producing a generation of lawyers whose vision
of the law will again extend beyond the interests of those who offer
the largest retainers" to borrow once more from my Brother Douglas.
I hope I have not left the impression of carping. Of course, the
American law schools in general and this law school in particular are
well aware of the challenge and will surely meet it. If my tone seems
critical it is only because the law schools have already imposed such
high standards upon themselves that they also invite other branches of
the profession to appraise their performance critically.
With that, which you may perhaps think is an impertinent pre-
liminary, I return to the subject of pre-trial discovery in criminal
cases. I'm sure you will appreciate now why I think this is anything
but a dry topic, or one which is unworthy of so memorable an occasion
as this. Few issues raise more sharply the basic ideological clash be-
tween opposed theories of criminal justice. Perhaps this is the reason
for the bitterness that has often marked the debate. Until a few years
ago American courts had virtually closed minds to any proposals for
criminal discovery. As recently as 1927 Mr. Justice Cardozo was able
to discern only "the beginnings or at least the glimmerings" of a
"power in courts of criminal jurisdiction to compel the discovery of
documents in furtherance of justice." 5 Of course, I suspect that there
has for some time been a very great deal of discovery in actual day to
day administration of the criminal law. I mean by this that prose-
cutors have not been loath to show their files to defense counsel-to
some counsel because they trust them; more often, to any counsel, if
disclosure offers the chance that counsel will persuade the client to
enter a plea and save the prosecutor the trouble, and the state the
expense of a trial.6 Apart from the constitutional overtones of denial
of equal protection involved in such a practice, I think we must all
agree that the opportunity for discovery on equal terms should either
be the right of all accused, or the right of none.
5. People ex el. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 32, 156 N.E. 84, 86
(1927).
6. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ALI & ABA, THE
PROBLEMS OF DIscoVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES 4-6 (1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss3/1
PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
Things have progressed dramatically since Mr. Justice Cardozo
wrote in 1927. California has gone particularly far not only in allow-
ing the accused discovery of the state's case, 7 but has recently ven-
tured to explore some areas where the state may, despite the self-
incrimination privilege, compel discovery by the defendant., The
States of Washington 9 and Pennsylvania 0 have also made strides. But
by and large the states are still unreceptive.". I think it is particularly
ironic that, according to Mr. Justice Jackson, Soviet prosecutors at
the War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg protested against adoption of
the prevailing American procedures on the ground that they're "not
fair to defendants."' 21 The upshot was a compromise procedure which
permitted the accused at those trials more liberal discovery than
7. See, e.g., Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773 (1958) ; Powell
v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957). See also Garber, The
Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 3, 18-23 (1962).
8. In Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held last year that the State might obtain discovery of the
names of expert witnesses whom the defendant planned to call at trial, and of
certain medical reports relevant to the defendant's projected defense of impotency
against a charge of rape. While a number of states (including California) have
various statutory provisions authorizing limited discovery by the prosecution of
the defense, see notes 27 & 28 infra, the Jones case appears to represent the first
judicial recognition of such a procedure. Two judges of the California Supreme
Court dissented on the ground that such discovery raised serious problems of
self-incrimination. See generally Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Con-
stitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 838-42 (1963).
9. See e.g., State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
10. See e.g., Di Joseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958). Particularly
significant to this case is the fact that the Attorney General of the State, as
amicus curiae, filed a brief in support of the defendant's request for broader dis-
covery rights. The brief stated:
It is submitted that the more liberal use of discovery in criminal cases is not
only being practiced by the courts but also by the district attorneys of
metropolitan communities .. . and this practice greatly aids in the adminis-
tration of justice .... Under the present system in civilized communities
where counsel is informed of the real strength of the Commonwealth's case,
he is better enabled to give the proper advice to his client and trials are
shortened, issues are met more fairly, guilty pleas are very often made,
particularly in homicide cases, and the administration of justice is not only
speeded up but made more fair and exact. Brief for the Attorney General as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 11-12.
11. See generally Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12
STAN. L. Rsv. 293 (1960). See for further discussion of the problem, Comment,
1961 U. ILL. L. FORUM 187; Note, Discovery in Criminal Proceedings, 13 FLA. L.
Rsv. 242 (1960); Note, Criminal Discovery-the State of the Law, 6 UTAH L.
Rsv. 531 (1959).
12. See Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International Legal System,
22 TEMP. L.Q. 147, 150-51 (1948); Bull, Nurnberg Trial, 7 F.R.D. 175, 178 (1947).
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allowed under American law, although apparently narrower than
Soviet or French practice sanctions.1 3
England went through our experience long ago. When in 1792 pre-
trial inspection of documents was sought by a high official of the East
India Company charged with malfeasance and corruption, it was
denied out-of-hand with the outraged comment of the Lord Chief
Justice that to grant such a request would "subvert the whole system
of criminal law."' 4 But by 1883 Sir James Stephen was able to say
that this too was barbarism not to be tolerated by a decent criminal
procedure.' 5 And, of course, today there is substantial pretrial dis-
covery of the Crown's case. Lord Devlin is authority that on the pre-
liminary hearing, antecedent to indictment, the Crown is required
"to make a complete disclosure of the whole of its case."", In this
way, Lord Devlin explains, if an indictment results, "the defense gets
to kmow the whole of the material that will be put against them." 1'
And the Crown may not use at the trial against the accused any
evidence not disclosed to him at the preliminary hearing. If the Crown
turns up more evidence it must first give defense counsel notice of
what it is.',
It may appear strange that resistance to criminal discovery should
be so stubborn in America, when Chief Justice Marshall seemed so
13. See Orfeld, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59
W. VA. L. RaV. 221, 232-33 (1957).
14. King v. Holland, 4 Durn. & E. 691, 692, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249 (K.B.
1792). Also instructive and illuminating is the observation of another of the Jus-
tices, who concurred in the result: "It is clear that neither at common law, or under
any of the statutes, is the defendant entitled as a matter of right, to have his
application granted. And if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting
this request, it would be dangerous in the extreme, and totally unfounded on
precedent." Id. at 694, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1250.
15. [lIt did not occur to the legislature that, if a man is to be tried for his
life, he ought to know beforehand what the evidence against him is,
and.., it did not appear to them that to let him know even what were
the names of the witnesses was so great a favour that it ought to be
reserved for people accused of a crime for which legislators themselves
or their friends and connections were likely to be prosecuted. I STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 226 (1883).
LThe defendant] was not allowed as a matter of right, but only as
an occasional favor ... to see his [own] witnesses and put their evidence
in order. When he came into court, he was set to fight for his life with
absolutely no knowledge of the evidence to be produced against him.
Id. at 398.
16. DEVI.N, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 112 (1958).
17. Ibid.
18. There are, however, exceptions and limitations upon the access which the
English defendant has to the Crown's case:
[Tjhere could be much information which the defendant might need for
proper preparation of his defense which would not be disclosed to him bythis machinery, either because it is withheld by the prosecution as not ad-missible, or because, although admissible, it is evidence which the prosecution
does not intend to offer at the trial. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: DilemmaReal or" Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Ray. 56, 66 (1961).
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strongly to approve it. You will recall that as a Circuit Justice he
presided in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr. 9 At that trial a re-
quest was made on Burr's behalf for pre-trial inspection of a letter
addressed to the President of the United States and in the possession
of the United States Attorney. Although the great Chief Justice did
not hold that there was an absolute right to compel disclosure, in char-
acteristically strong terms he stated his view that if the letter had
evidentiary relevance, or indeed was useful in cross-examination of
any Government witness at the trial, it could not, in fairness to the
defendant, be withheld from him. But the value of that precedent was
virtually unappreciated in our country for almost a century and a
half.20
I submit that we must rethink our opposition to allowing the ac-
cused criminal discovery, certainly if we are to continue to maintain
that our system of criminal justice, if not favoring the accused, at least
keeps the scales evenly balanced in his contest with the state. Are the
scales really evenly balanced? Who are our criminal defendants? Are
they people having relatives with resources capable of helping in their
defense? By and large, the so-called "white collar" criminal probably
does have the resources and friends to aid him in his defense. Justice
is indeed well served when prosecution and defense are fairly evenly
matched. But is this the situation for the vast majority of our "blue
collar" defendants? Judges know that the largest percentage of these
people are indigent.21 To put it another way, these offenders, the
largest number by far of the total of all offenders, come from that
section of society where conditions result in the largest crime rate. It
is here also that the mentally retarded are found-the experts make
the provocative suggestion that deprived socio-economic upbringing
causes considerably more retardation than springs from organic or
19. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall referred in the course of his opinion also to the con-
stitutional guarantees of a speedy and public trial and compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses. Id. at 33.
20. Over a hundred years after the Burr case, for example, even Learned Hand
found little merit in a request for criminal discovery on behalf of the defendant,
principally on the ground of his belief that the advantage in the criminal prose-
cution lay almost wholly with the accused. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). The expansion of criminal discovery in the state courts
has taken place very largely within the past decade. See Fletcher, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 297-305.
21. A recent study indicates that, although the figures vary considerably from
state to state, an average of thirty to sixty percent of criminal defendants lack
funds with which to retain counsel. SPEcIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSN. OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORE AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASS'N, EQUAL JusTIcE FOR THE AccusED 80 (1959). Cf. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID
IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1951).
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hereditary factors. Do not these less privileged of our society present
the particular problem that without resources to prepare a defense,
they often don't have an adequate defense? Can we boast of a decent
administration of the criminal law if we don't provide them some re-
dress against this hard reality? Criminal discovery would be one tool
whereby they would have a better chance to meet on more equal terms
what the state, at its leisure and without real concern for expense,
gathers to convict them.22
And what of the task society puts on the shoulders of assigned
counsel? For public defenders are still provided by only a few states,
and the Federal Government is only beginning to work out such a
plan; assigned counsel must perforce provide what legal representa-
tion these defendants receive. But we not only give assigned counsel
no compensation for his services in most cases-we deny him both
financial help to prepare a defense and the discovery, which if not the
best, might at least provide a substitute. Moreover, the court-ap-
pointed lawyer in a criminal case usually comes to the case late, after
the state has gathered its evidence against the accused.23 Assigned
counsel therefore must do what he can within the limited time usually
allowed him before trial, often long after the trail has grown cold.
He must deal with an accused whose obvious interest in self-justifica-
tion complicates his lawyer's task of finding the true facts.24 Even if
he can learn the names of the witnesses against his client, those wit-
nesses have already talked to the state's investigators and more fre-
quently than not have been warned not to talk with anyone repre-
senting the accused. If his client has signed a confession he has added
problems. In view of the practical realities of police interrogation, he
travels a rough road if he would establish whether the confession was
coerced, or fairly represents what his client told the officers.2r In all
22. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960); Young and Gray, Trial by
Ambush-The Case for Pre-trial Discovery in Criminal Law, 25 NIET. STATE BAR
3. 91, 96-99 (1960).
23. See Louisell, op. cit. supra note 18, at 94-96.
24. See Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 11, at 306.
25. See Arens & Meadow, Psycholinguistics and the Confession Dilemma, 56
CoLUnm. L. REv. 19, 27-31 (1956). Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey
Supreme Court has recently commented on this problem:
We must be mindful of the role of a confession. It frequently becomes the
core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for the judicial proceeding to
become more of a review of what transpired at headquarters than a trial of
the basic criminal event itself. No one would deny a defendant's right
thoroughly to investigate the facts of the crime to prepare for trial of that
event. When a confession is given and issues surrounding it tend to displace
the criminal event as the focus of the trial, there should be like opportunity
to get at the facts of the substituted issue. Simple justice requires that a
defendant be permitted to prepare to meet what thus looms as the critical
element of the case against him. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 137, 146
A.2d 313, 316 (1958).
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fairness, should he not at least be allowed a copy to see what there is
about the confession which will permit him to pursue that inquiry
before trial? And if some of the state's evidence is physical and tan-
gible and has been subjected to police laboratory analysis or tests, the
assigned counsel denied a look at the reports is at an obvious disadvan-
tage.26 Even if he can see the objects the police tested he won't have
the funds or the facilities to have tests of his own made. Not every
accused has the good fortune to have an ingenious Perry Mason as his
counsel.
What assigned counsel obviously needs to discharge the heavy re-
sponsibility we give him is at least the opportunity to do what the
state does when the trail is fresh, namely, seek corroboration of the
accused's story, or lack of it, from external facts through avenues of
inquiry opened by what the state has learned. The implication in the
argument against discovery is that the accused is guilty, so that not
only may he not complain of the use against him even of his confes-
sion, or to its use as a source of leads to make the case against him as
ironclad as possible, but that he really has no complaint that his
counsel is denied access to the same materials to aid him better to
develop the whole truth. In other words, the state may eat its cake
and have it too. To that degree, does not the denial of all discovery set
aside the presumption of innocence-is not such denial blind to the
superlatively important public interest in the acquittal of the inno-
cent? To shackle counsel so that he cannot effectively seek out the
truth and afford the accused the representation which is not his
privilege but his absolute right seems seriously to imperil the bedrock
presumption of innocence.
And might not expanded discovery benefit the prosecution as well
as the accused? If sharpening of the issues, exposure of untenable
arguments and more efficient marshaling of the evidence result from
discovery, doesn't the prosecution profit? For if voluntary disclosure
to defense cousel often results in guilty pleas because defense counsel
becomes convinced of the hopelessness of the client's cause, should not
a rule authorizing criminal discovery in every case result in even more
dispositions without trial ?2
26. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 940, 1061
(1961). With regard to the availability of discovery of such reports, compare,
e.p., Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960), with Pinana v.
Stat, 852 P.2d 824 (Nev. 1960).
27. See Anderson, What Price Conviction?, AMERICAN BAR AssN. SECTION OP
CImiAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS 41 (1958); Fletcher, supra note 11, at 319. In this
conection more liberal use of discovery might also complement, as it has in civil
case, the expanded use of the pre-trial conference as a medium for limiting and
refing the issues, and for settlement before litigation-here either in the form
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The beneficial results claimed for statutes of an increasing number
of states, which require an accused to give the prosecution pre-trial
notice of an alibi or insanity defense, 8 include not only preventing
surprise at the trial but also aiding more effective preparation for
trial29 What justifies our being so sure then that according criminal
discovery to the accused will benefit only the accused at the expense
of the state?
But rigid opposition to pre-trial criminal discovery for the accused
still persists. I don't think the reasons for this resistance have been
better expressed than they were in a case decided ten years ago when
I sat on the New Jersey Supreme Court. By a closely divided vote
that court denied discovery to an accused of a copy of his own con-
fession.30 In the ordinary affairs of life we would be startled at the
suggestion that one should not be entitled as a matter of course to a
copy of something he signed. But the New Jersey court so held-and
in a case in which the accused was charged with murder so that his
life was at stake.
The facts were these. In the early morning hours from midnight to
5 a. in., in custody and without counsel, and surrounded only by
police officers, the accused had what the police called "conversations"
with them during which not the accused but one of the officers wrote
down fourteen pages of narrative which, when completed, the accused
read aloud, and signed after the officer read them back to him. Two
months later the accused was assigned counsel to defend him at the
trial. The accused told assigned counsel that he had signed something
but had no recollection whatever of what was said in what he signed.
Counsel sought out the prosecutor, who admitted that the accused had
signed a confession, but refused to permit counsel to examine it.
Counsel then sought an order from a trial judge directing the prose-
cutor to allow counsel to inspect and make a copy of the alleged con-
of dismissal of the prosecution, or a guilty plea by the defendant. See Comment,
Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 646 (1951). Cf. 4
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE % 26.02 (3d ed. 1962).
28. Some fourteen states have adopted statutes which require the defendant to
give notice to the prosecution if he intends to introduce evidence of an alibi, e.g.,
N.Y. CODE CRm . PRoc. § 295-1; OHIO REV. CODE: ANN. § 2945.58. A slightly larger
number of states require by statute notice to the prosecution of an intended plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016; IND. ANN. STAT.§ 9-1701.
29. Compare Williams, Advance Notice of the Defence, 1959 CRIM. L. REV. 548,
with Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 635-37
(1951). See also Statton & Watkins, Is Specific Notice of the Defense of Alibi
Desirable? 18 TEXAs L. REV. 151 (1940).
30. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). But the New Jersey
Supreme Court has since substantially altered its view, see State v. Johnson, 28
N.J. 133, 145 A.d 313 (1958).
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fession. The trial judge granted the order. The prosecutor took an
appeal and our court by a vote of 4-3 reversed the trial judge.
The opinion for the court was written by one of the great judges of
our time, the late Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt. His distinction
is reason enough to acknowledge the force of the reasons he advanced
against criminal discovery. Even more so is this the case, in light of
his monumental service in fostering pre-trial discovery and pre-trial
conference procedures in civil causes. His powerful voice against the
extension to criminal causes of the same procedures necessarily gives
pause to anyone who would question the soundness of that view.
He marshaled four arguments:
First, one purpose of broad discovery is to minimize opportunities
for falsification of evidence. But unlike civil proceedings, he said-
and I quote himn-"[I]n criminal proceedings long experience has
taught the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest factfind-
ing, but on the contrary to perjury and the suppression of evidence.
Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will
often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false de-
fense .... "31
Second, the result of full discovery in criminal causes would be-I
quote again-"that the criminal defendant who is informed of the
names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe or
frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting them-
selves so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover, many wit-
nesses, if they know that the defendant will have knowledge of their
names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with informa-
tion during the investigation of the crime .... ,,32
Third, in view of the defendant's constitutional protection against
self-incrimination, discovery would be a one-way street, for the state
would have no right whatsoever to demand any inspection of any of
the accused's documents, or to take his deposition, or to submit inter-
rogatories to him. In other words-once more I quote- "[T] he state
is completely at the mercy of the defendant who can produce surprise
evidence at the trial, can take the stand or not as he wishes, and gen-
erally can introduce any sort of unforeseeable evidence he desires in
his own defense. To allow him to discover the prosecutor's whole
case against him would be to make the prosecutor's task almost in-
surmountable."' 3
Fourth, the favorable English experience with allowing the accused
broad discovery offers no guide for America. The constantly increas-
ing rate of crimes of violence in this country is a particular reason for
not expanding the safeguards which now protect the criminal de-
31. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 211-12, 98 A.2d at 885.
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fendant. The law-abiding instincts of the English, he said, "are in
marked contrast to the disrespect for law which has long character-
ized the American frontier and which has not yet disappeared as the
criminal statistics indicate in certain segments of the American
population."31
Chief Justice Vanderbilt concluded that even as to the accused's
own confession these reasons apply, for "[to grant a defendant the
unqualified right to inspect his confession before trial would be to give
him an opportunity to produce false testimony and to commit perjury
at the expense of society."' 5
"We have in New Jersey," he said, "set up adequate safeguards to
protect the criminal defendant from being prejudiced by the admis-
sion in evidence of a statement signed by him which has not emanated
from his own free will."13" The Chief Justice here referred to the
familiar requirements governing the determination of the voluntari-
ness of a confession and, hence, its admissibility against the accused.
Plainly enough, each of these reasons has a persuasive appeal. But
are their merits so clear? First is the reason that pre-trial discovery
would inevitably result in a perjured defense. That objection, I say
with all respect, is startlingly reminiscent of Sir John Wigram's
reason expressed over a century ago when the struggle to introduce
discovery in Chancery was bitterly waged. Said Sir John, "[E] xperi-
ence ... has shewn-or (at least) courts of justice in this country
act upon the principle-that the possible mischiefs of surprise at the
trial are more than counterbalanced by the danger of perjury, which
must inevitably be incurred, when either party is permitted, before
a trial, to know the precise evidence against which he has to con-
tend ... ."'IT But, as has been trenchantly observed, "English courts
never had any experience at all in the matter .... ,,38 By the same
token, how can we be so positive criminal discovery will produce
perjured defenses when we have firmly shut the door to such dis-
covery? That alleged experience is simply non-existent." So if it be
34. Id. at 219, 98 A.2d at 889.
35. Id. at 226, 98 A.2d at 893.
36. Id. at 215, 98 A.2d at 887.
37. WIGRAM, POINTS IN THE LAw OF DIscovERY § 347 (1842).
38. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J.
863, 867 (1933).
39. There have been many assertions that liberal discovery invites perjury
and fabrication, but virtually no tangible proof or documentation of these asser-
tions. What meager statistical evidence there is suggests that perjury is a very
slight danger indeed. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 310-11. Indeed, it seems
quite as likely that better knowledge on both sides concerning the material evi-
dence, and an awareness on the defendant's part how much of the case is recorded
on paper, would serve to deter rather than encourage perjury and fabrication.
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true, as unfortunately it is, that crime is on the rise in this nation,
we surely can't blame that regrettable fact on the operation of any
criminal discovery procedures.
I must say I cannot be persuaded that the old hobgoblin perjury,
invariably raised with every suggested change in procedure to make
easier the discovery of the truth, supports the case against criminal
discovery. I should think rather that its complete fallacy has been
starkly exposed through the extensive and analogous experience in
civil causes where liberal discovery has been allowed and perjury
has not been fostered. Indeed, this experience has suggested that
liberal discovery, far from abetting, actually deters perjury and
fabrication.- Surely that experience is solid evidence of the beneficial
results of discovery to the cause of justice, without that defeat of
justice through perjury foretold by the prophets of doom. In any
event, as has been said, "The true safeguard against perjury is not
to refuse to permit any inquiry at all, for that will eliminate the true
as well as the false, but the inquiry should be so conducted as to
separate and distinguish the one from the other where both are
present."
We must remember that society's interest is equally that the inno-
cent shall not suffer and not alone that the guilty shall not escape.
Discovery, basically a tool for truth, is the most effective device yet
fashioned for the reduction of the aspect of the adversary element to
a minimum. Even Dean Wigmore, certainly no champion of leniency
for the criminally accused, could find no merit in this objection that
discovery would encourage perjury. Said he: "The possibility that a
dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for
committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means
of clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and
with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law ... to
allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all." 4'
Besides, isn't there a suggestion in the argument, and a rather
slanderous one, that the criminal defense bar cannot be trusted?
After all, isn't it the defense attorney and not the accused himself
who will have access to the state's materials? Whatever justification
there may be for the assumption that the desperate accused will try
anything to escape his fate, the notion that his lawyer can't wait to
40. See Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE
L.J. 1132, 1154 (1951): "Facilitation of perjury has been a bogey man of dis-
covery for over a hundred years. No evidence can be produced conclusively to
prove or disprove it, and the consensus among lawyers is to reject it. This investi-
gation disclosed the variety of ways in which lawyers use discovery to thwart
perjury." See also 4 Moopx, FDEmAL PRACTICE 26.02 [2] (3d ed. 1962).
41. 6 WIGMORE, EVDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
conspire with him to that end hardly comports with the foundation
of trust and ethics which underlies our professional honor system.
The second argument is that an accused, knowing the names of
witnesses against him, may see to it that they are silenced before the
trial. Of course, there have been instances where this has happened.
But no one suggests that discovery in criminal cases should be at large
and without the intervention of judicial discretion. Surely whether
or not this is a danger in a particular case is a matter to which courts
ought to give some consideration. Where that possibility may appear,
a trial judge's discretion affords an ample safeguard. Dangers and
other abuses of this kind are clearly a matter of legitimate concern-
they argue however not for wholesale prohibition of criminal dis-
covery but only for circumspection and for appropriate sanctions
tailored to dealing with apprehended abuses in the particular case.42
The third objection-that our constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination prevents discovery being a two-way street-is admit-
tedly more troublesome. Another very distinguished judge, Learned
Hand, also voiced this objection:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when
there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense,
fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.... Our dangers do
not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has
been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted.
It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic for-
malism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and de-
feats the prosecution of crime.43
But is this premise really sound? Is the privilege against self-
incrimination in fact a barrier to state discovery of the accused? The
innumerable cases that come to our Court charging police abuses of
the interrogation process suggest the contrary. The right to conduct
prolonged questioning of suspects is vigorously championed by some
law enforcement authorities. Success very frequently crowns the effort,
if the proportion of guilty pleas and convictions resting upon confes-
sions affords a reliable guide. And even apart from discovery of this
sort, what of the investigatory paraphernalia important to the prepa-
ration of criminal evidence which is, as of course it should be, avail-
able to law officers? Laboratories, skilled investigators, experts in all
areas are an essential part of the equipment of every agency which
42. See Louisell, supra note 18, at 63, 90, 98-101.
43. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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would boast of being abreast of the modern techniques for the detec-
tion and prevention of crime. All of us are gratified that our agencies
are so equipped, and would not want to strip their resources. But I
suggest that it overstates the fact to say that we don't need to extend
criminal discovery procedures to the accused because the scales are
already distorted in his favor by the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the fact that the state has the burden of proving his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The next argument is that the experience of other nations where
broad discovery has not subverted the criminal law, notably England
and Canada, does not help us. I can't as readily as my former Chief
disregard the absence of the conjured dangers in England and Canada
under a form of discovery advantaging the accused far beyond any-
thing in our system. First of all, the argument that crime is increas-
ing at a greater rate in America than in those countries would, I
think, come as a surprise to their law enforcement officers. But if it
is true that we are a less law-abiding people than the British, how
explain the satisfaction with broad criminal discovery of our neighbor
Canada between whose mores and our own similarities are so often
remarked ?"
There is one final issue to which I might turn my attention for a
moment. Assuming that, as I believe, we should adopt broader crim-
inal discovery, should the definition of its limits be a matter for legis-
latures or courts? I incline to believe that just as discovery in civil
causes is largely a matter of court rules, so also should be the fashion-
ing of rules for criminal discovery. For one thing, most of the prog-
ress already made toward liberalizing criminal discovery has come
from court decisions and court rules and not from legislative enact-
ments. This is true even as to the limited discovery permitted under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 and is so much the more
true as to the States. Two other reasons also suggest that judicial
rather than legislative rulemaking is to be preferred. The extent to
which discovery should be allowed in particular cases will present
complex problems. There will be questions for the exercise of sound
44. See, e.g., Rex v. Bohozuk, 87 Can. C.C. 165 (1947).
45. Limited federal criminal discovery is sanctioned by FED. R. CRIM. P. 16,
17 (c); see Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); Note, The
Scope of Criminal Discovery Against the Government, 67 HARV. L. REV. 492
(1954). For a judicial suggestion that the inherent criminal discovery powers of
the federal courts may exceed the express powers conferred by the rules, see
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (1949). Compare generally on the allocation
of responsibility in the area Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76
HARV. L. Rav. 275 (1962); Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to
Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. Rl.
234, 250-54 (1951).
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discretion depending upon the particular materials of which discovery
is sought. The showing of need of a given accused may require dis-
covery despite strong state interests advanced by the prosecution
against allowing it. In other words, there will be much need for the
striking of a proper balance in individual cases. Surely arguments
of the prosecution that, for example, witnesses might be imperiled are
not wholly illusory. And to the extent discovery of the accused may
be sought by the prosecution, there will necessarily lurk below the
surface constitutional questions arising from the privilege against
self-incrimination.46
I do not deny the force of the objections which have been raised
against expanded criminal discovery. All I have attempted to suggest
this morning is that these objections, if not wholly invalid, are simply
not insurmountable. In any event, I have great difficulty accepting
them as reasons for refusing to allow criminal discovery under appro-
priate safeguards. Where dangers do exist, and abuses are threatened,
not denial of discovery but appropriate safeguards to prevent such
dangers and abuses, should be our effort. We found out that the
civil discovery procedures could be abused, and fashioned safeguards
against them. The court-made rules protecting the attorney's work
product47 and enforcing privileges against disclosures of confidential
or secret information are examples. 4S If there is merit in the insis-
tence that the public interest in law enforcement requires even
stronger safeguards against unwarranted disclosure of the prosecu-
tion's ease, surely appropriate sanctions can be devised. In the rare
46. See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 69, 372 P.2d 919, 927 (1962)
(dissenting opinion), suggesting that discovery of a defendant's list of prospective
witnesses and of certain medical reports relevant to his defense of impotence, in
a prosecution for rape, constituted a dangerous "inroad upon the . . .right of a
defendant in a criminal case to remain silent, if he chooses, at every stage of the
proceeding against him."
It has even been suggested that discovery in favor of the accused might be
constitutionally compelled in certain situations. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 927,
964-66, 22 So. 2d 273, 285 (1945). So, also, Judge Kaufman has suggested that
"there are situations where discovery of the defendant's statement would be
demanded under the aegis provided defendant by the fifth amendment. Such a
situation might occur where psychiatric examinations of defendant before trial
are indispensable to the adequate preparation of a defense of insanity, or where
defendant is seeking exclusion of the statement by challenging its authenticity."
Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in
the Federal Courts, 57 COLUm. L. Ruv. 1113, 1120-21 (1957).
47. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Developments in the Law-
Discovery, 74 HARv. L. RaV. 940, 1027-46 (1961).
48. Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b),
for example, authorizes a court before commencement of an oral examination in
a civil case, to make certain specified protective orders and "any other order
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case, the denial of all discovery may be compelled to protect the
safety of witnesses or prevent an apparent perversion of the judicial
process. 4" So I would leave the primary responsibility with the trial
judge under such guidance from appellate courts as may be necessary
to mark its proper limits. The gain to the public interest in the pure
and just administration of the criminal law is well worth the risks.
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, or oppression."
49. See Louisell, suznm note 18, at 98-101, for the suggestion that the problem
of discovery might be approached differently in cases involving organized crime,
or defendants known to be representatives of powerful criminal syndicates, where
the granting of liberal discovery might be peculiarly hazardous.
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